Excited About the Possibility of Being Part of the Usaf dod Again

U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021: Air Force

December 3, 2020

Office ofU.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. The Air Force continues the development and procurement of next-generation aircraft to meet the demands of great power conflict. Fielding of new aircraft has been enough to abort the increase in fleet age. However, the Air Forcefulness is non buying enough new aircraft to sustain its strength construction, so it seeks to retire older aircraft.

Primal Takeaways

Air Strength armed services personnel levels, active and reserve component, increase slightly in FY 2022 and over the five-year period but remain essentially level. The largest increases are amid civilians.

Like the other services, the Air Force faces high day-to-day operational tempo while at the same time preparing to meet the demands of keen power conflict.

Aircraft inventories and fleet crumbling have stabilized in the about term.

Nevertheless, the Air Strength is not buying enough new shipping to maintain the inventory over the long term. Increasing procurement to the levels needed to sustain the inventory will crave historically high costs.

Instead, the Air Force plans to close this gap by retiring older aircraft and shrinking the force, possibly essentially. However, Congress has been reluctant to exercise this in the past.

Given these circumstances, the Air Strength is backing away from its 25 per centum expansion goal to attain 386 operational squadrons.

The FY 2022 budget procures no unmanned aircraft, so the unmanned fleet has plateaued at 6 percent of the forcefulness.

Nuclear forces require a greater share of the Air Strength upkeep as Reagan-era systems reach the terminate of their service lives, and equally a effect, nuclear modernization generates some opposition.

The Space Strength continues to take shape, and then far entirely from Air Force elements.

End Strength in FY 2021

All three components maintain the same major elements of the force structure. Changes in personnel levels are pocket-sized.

A brilliant spot is active/reserve relations. By working closely with its reserve components, and giving them at least a small end strength increment, the Air Force has avoided the internal conflicts that had marred earlier budgets and required a 2022 force structure commission to brand peace.ⁱ

Some other bright spot is that the pandemic is solving the Air Force's long-standing and, until recently, severe pilot shortage. With the commercial travel industry in deep recession, the airlines accept stopped hiring, so pilots are staying in the service.

As the chart in a higher place shows, finish force rose in the wake of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. After 2004, however, the Air Forcefulness adopted a strategy of retiring older aircraft and reducing personnel to shift funds to modernization. Active-duty end strength fell from a high of 377,000 to a low of 316,000. Critics argued that this subtract had harmed readiness and gutted the pilot inventory.ⁱⁱ Thus, the Air Force began increasing cease strength in FY 2016.

Personnel levels volition stay at about the FY 2022 level through FY 2025. This is probable a hedge confronting an uncertain budget time to come. The Air Force is reluctant to add personnel that it cannot sustain just is not at the point of major cuts either. However, the Air Strength budget documents reveal no details.

Indeed, this lack of data permeates the Air Forcefulness FY 2022 budget documents. Although there is extensive information near the budget year, there is nigh no description of what might happen in the future for personnel or strength construction. This contrasts with previous years, where the budget documents had some explanation of what would happen during the five-twelvemonth planning period. Further, the Air Force'due south two major evolution programs, the B-21 bomber and the Adjacent Generation Air Authorization shipping, are classified programs about which little is known publicly.

Operational Tempo: Gone as a Stated Concern

Like the other services, the Air Force notes how busy it is. In the annual posture argument, Secretary Barrett and Full general Goldfein stated that "over 28,000 Airmen deployed worldwide final twelvemonth . . . flew more than 75,000 strike sorties, employed more than than 11,000 weapons in Iraq, Syrian arab republic, and Transitional islamic state of afghanistan, and conducted more than 27,000 airlift and refueling sorties across U.Due south. Key Command."ⁱⁱⁱ

Despite the description of high activity, whatever mention of stress resulting from these operations is gone. RAND noted that "since the 1990s, the Us armed forces has operated at a tempo more akin to war than peace" and constitute that "prolonged operations are driving contemporary [Air Force] capacity shortfalls" and that these would go along in the four notional futures that RAND analyzed.⁴ Nonetheless, comparing the Air Force's argument virtually operations this twelvemonth with statements in previous years, the level seems to have gone down from the height of the bombing campaigns against ISIS in Syria/Republic of iraq and against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Strength Structure in FY 2022 and Beyond

The Air Strength has stabilized its force structure at about 5,500 aircraft, after a sharp decline from 2002 to 2009. The Air Force has maintained its inventories by allowing the average aircraft age to increase (to 29.2 years).^five

This happened because the Air Strength took a procurement vacation in the late-1990s and, for its numerous fighter/attack aircraft, planned to move directly to an all fifth-generation force armada. This plan collapsed in the early-2000s when the F-22 purchase was curtailed at 187 shipping, and the F–35 program was delayed many years because of evolution problems.

Thus, Stephen Kosiak, a long-time upkeep commentator, has argued that these trends [shrinking inventories and aging fleets] arise from deliberate choices: "[H]istorical trends in the US armed services's force structure and modernization plans are largely the result of policy and programmatic choices fabricated by DOD and service leadership. Reverse to widely held belief . . . the size and shape of today'southward forces are not only a byproduct of budgetary or other pressures beyond DOD's control."⁶

The proficient news is that armada aging overall has nearly stopped as new shipping enter the force. The bad news is that the procurement cost of just maintaining the current inventory will rise far above historical shipping procurement budget levels through the 2030s.

The skilful news is that fleet crumbling overall has virtually stopped as new shipping enter the force. The bad news is that the procurement cost of merely maintaining the current inventory will ascension far above historical aircraft procurement budget levels through the 2030s.

Although the Navy and Army also face challenges with aircraft crumbling and maintaining their aircraft fleets, the Air Force is in far worse shape regarding aging and the slow acquisition of replacements.⁷

Some fleets are in relatively good shape: the transport fleet (21 years, on average) because of acquiring C-17s and C-130s, the special operations fleet (12 years) because of its high priority, and the UAVs/RPVs (six years) because of large wartime purchases. Other fleets are old: fighter/attack (29 years old), bomber (42 years), tanker (49 years), helicopter (32 years), and trainers (32 years).⁸ All the older fleets (except for some specialty aircraft) have programs in identify for modernization, just the programs take been delayed, are expensive, and may take years to implement fully.

Some fleets are in relatively good shape . . . other fleets are old. All the older fleets . . . have programs in place for modernization, merely the programs have been delayed, are expensive, and may accept years to implement fully.

Unfortunately, the FY 2022 procurement level is far likewise low to sustain the Air Strength'south current inventory. In FY 2021, the Air Force proposes to procure 106 shipping.

Assuming a 30-year service life, this will sustain an inventory of three,180 aircraft.

106 aircraft procured in FY 2022 x 30-twelvemonth service life = 3,180 total inventory

The current inventory is 5,387. To sustain that inventory requires well-nigh doubling the number of aircraft acquired per twelvemonth.

5, 387 target inventory ÷ xxx-year service life = 180 shipping acquired per year

Even if aircraft service life were extended to 40 years, the Air Force would yet need to buy substantially more aircraft.

v, 387 target inventory ÷ 40-yr service life = 135 aircraft acquired per year

The bottom line is that to sustain its current inventory, the Air Force will have to buy many more than aircraft or less expensive aircraft. Alternatively, the Air Force will need to greatly reduce its shipping inventory and sharply cutting its strength structure.

Divest to Invest

The Air Force has two reasons to reduce its aircraft inventory and associated force structure. Starting time, as described above, is its disability to maintain the structure with the number of aircraft that information technology has been able to procure recently and in the foreseeable hereafter. Second is its desire to make a wide variety of (expensive) investments in advanced systems, aircraft, weapons, sensors, and networks that would exist suitable for conflict with a slap-up power.

General Charles Q. Brown, the new Air Forcefulness master of staff, expressed this in his first advice to Air Force personnel: "Our airmen need the states to integrate and accelerate the changes necessary to explore new operational concepts and bring more rapidly the capabilities that will help them in time to come fights." Thus, he talks about "ruthless prioritization," implying the elimination of many older systems.⁹ Air Strength budget documents foreshadow a large future strength construction cutting: "The Air Force is planning for less legacy force capacity to brainstorm investing additional manpower into capabilities for tomorrow'southward high-intensity conflict against about-peer competitors."¹⁰

General Charles Q. Dark-brown, the new Air Force principal of staff . . . talks about "ruthless prioritization," implying the elimination of many older systems.

For this reason, the Air Force has repeatedly proposed to retire aircraft. The proposed retirements for FY 2022 are small-scale (see Table 4). Congress, notwithstanding, has often aghast at retirements, noting that the Air Force says it is already too small for the tasks it has been given. When the Air Force proposed eliminating the A-10 fleet, for instance, Congress opposed such an activeness, putting explicit prohibitions in the FY 2022 NDAA and proposed FY 2022 NDAA.¹¹

A recent CSIS report laid out the savings that the Air Strength might reach by retiring certain aircraft fleets. The fleets most likely to be retired are the KC-10 tanker, the B-one and B-2 bombers, the A-x close air support aircraft, the E-8C surveillance aircraft, the U-2 spy plane, and the Due east-3 airborne warning and command aeroplane. The report argued that the greatest savings arose when entire fleets were eliminated, thus eliminating the fixed costs of a training and maintenance infrastructure.

However, the study also noted that such retirements would get out gaps in Air Force capabilities. Retiring the B-two bombers, for example, would leave the United States without a stealthy penetrating bomber until the B-21 was fielded in strength.¹²

These force construction trade-offs drive a series of strategic choices almost airpower:

What kinds of conflicts should the Air Force fix for: those against great powers or a spectrum of air environments, including those with less-demanding environments? In lower threat air environments, such as North Korea, the Air Strength can utilize legacy aircraft extensively. For conflicts against great powers such as Communist china and Russia, with their sophisticated air defenses, the Air Force would need to focus exclusively on advanced capabilities.

How can airpower reach the greatest furnishings? Will the greatest effects come up from attacks close to friendly front lines—that is, through close air back up and battlefield interdiction? The army are potent advocates here, arguing that these effects are firsthand and tangible.¹³ Airpower advocates contend that the greatest effect comes from the deep attack of strategic targets. The Air Force has historically leaned toward the latter for a variety of organizational and doctrinal reasons.^xiv

What is the value of stealth in modern air warfare? Stealth—needed to penetrate heavily defended airspaces—is expensive to develop, procure, and sustain.¹⁵ Further, at that place is an operational penalty. Proponents argue that the price and performance trade-offs are worthwhile because of rising air threats.¹⁶ Opponents argue that only a small part of the fleet needs to be stealthy, while the rest can be non-stealthy.¹⁷

The answers to these questions go far beyond this report, but the questions show that there are difficult strategic decisions behind inventory numbers.

The Air Strength Expansion Proposal: Fading Abroad

Not surprisingly, given the Air Force'south difficulty in maintaining the electric current fleet size, its proposal for expansion is fading abroad.

Non surprisingly, given the Air Force'south difficulty in maintaining the current fleet size, its proposal for expansion is fading away.

In 2018, and so-Secretarial assistant of the Air Forcefulness Heather Wilson proposed a 25 percent increase in force structure, describing it as "the Air Force we need" (run into Chart five).¹⁸ This would increase the Air Force from 312 operational squadrons to 386. Much of the growth would be in enabling capabilities such as tankers, special forces, space, and especially command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which provide the precision targeting that long-range munitions require.

In 2022 and 2020, the Air Force reaffirmed this goal. General Goldfein discussed it explicitly and at length in his FY 2022 posture statement.¹⁹ It disappeared from the FY 2022 posture statement. This was unsurprising since the Air Force has taken no steps to achieve this expansion goal, unlike the Navy and its 355-ship goal. When Full general Charles Dark-brown, the new Air Force chief of staff, was asked about it, he said that 386 squadrons were indeed what the Air Strength needed to execute the strategy, but the goal had been a resource unconstrained answer to a congressional question. Instead, he talked about achieving the required "capability," non necessarily the numbers.^twenty

All of this might exist written off every bit another do in fiscally unconstrained planning, but the tension between the expansion goal and the Air Force's want to shrink to relieve money for modernization will provide a lever for those in Congress and elsewhere who are reluctant to retire older aircraft.

The State of the Fleets

In full general, the Air Strength has programs in place to modernize the private fleets, but this modernization has been delayed and will take time, and as a result, today's aging fleets will exist effectually for a long while. Nevertheless, each fleet faces its own circumstances and therefore deserves individual consideration.

The Bomber Forcefulness

The bomber force consists of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s. The long-range program is for the B-21 Raider to supersede the B-1s and B-2s. The B-52s will proceed in service at least into the 2040s and maybe beyond. The last B-52 airplane pilot has probably not however been born.

Since no new aircraft are being produced, the bomber strength continues to historic period (currently 43 years on average), though various upgrade programs keep the aircraft flight and operationally relevant, for example, new engines for the B-52s and a new defensive system for the B-2s. The Air Force would like to divest some of the B-1s early simply has encounter congressional opposition.

The B-21 Raider programme continues in development, with budget demands seeming to stabilize: $2.9 billion in FY 2022 and $two.8 billion in FY 2022 and remaining at that level through FY 2025. Considering the B-21 has a mid-2020s fielding date ("Initial Operating Adequacy"), the legacy B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s will comprise the bomber force for many years to come. Details are uncertain, however, because the B-21 remains a classified plan.

The Fighter Strength

The fighter/assail forcefulness has been the central chemical element of the Air Force since the finish of the bomber era in the early-1960s. It therefore requires detailed examination.

The average historic period of the fighter/assault force has increased from 8 years at the end of the Common cold State of war in 1991 to 26 years today, while numbers accept decreased from 4,000 in 1991 to 1,981 (total) today. Kosiak'south ascertainment is applicable here. Both fleet aging and reduced numbers outcome from an Air Force determination to cease production of fourth-generation aircraft (F-15s and F-16s) in the 1990s and instead wait for product of the 5th-generation (F-22s and F-35s). This was the reverse of the Navy's decision to continue production of the F-18. Unfortunately, production of the F-22 was concise at 187 aircraft during the upkeep drawdown in the late-2000s, and the F-35 was delayed many years from its original schedule.

F-35s: The Air Force again requests 48 shipping in FY 2021, about the aforementioned as for the concluding four years, although Congress routinely increases the purchase (to 62 in FY 2020) out of a concern that the aircraft are being fielded too slowly. Co-ordinate to the procurement budget documents, 48 will exist the long-term procurement level, rather than the 60 shipping per year that the Air Forcefulness had intended.²¹

After several years of making adept progress in maturing technologies, the shipping are operational, but the programme has however non achieved the planned levels of reliability and adequacy. The FY 2022 annual report of the director of Operational Examination and Evaluation (DOT&Eastward) (the latest bachelor of such reports) noted: "The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program continues to deport 873 unresolved deficiencies . . .. Although the program is working to fix deficiencies, new discoveries are still beingness made, resulting in just a minor decrease in the overall number of deficiencies." Reliability and maintainability metrics remain beneath goals. Operational testing continues.²²

Fielding of new F-35s is starting time to ease the crumbling of the armada (equally volition production of F-15EXs). Withal, at 48 shipping per yr, it would take another 28 years to reach the F-35 inventory objective of 1,763—or through FY 2049. Even at 60 aircraft per year, the Air Force goal, information technology would take 22 years—or through FY 2043. The average age of the fighter/set on armada will therefore remain high for a long time, perchance indefinitely.

F-15EX: A major change in the FY 2022 budget was that the Air Strength proposed buying a new version of the F-15E dual-function aircraft, the F-15EX. Although the procurement cost is but about x per centum lower than the F-35s currently (in part a effect of the F-35s higher production rate), the sustainment cost of an F-15EX is projected to be nearly 40 percent lower; therefore, the fleet will be more sustainable. Further, the fourth dimension needed for units to transition from legacy aircraft to the F-15EX is much shorter than the two years needed for the more complicated transition to the F-35A. Thus, the Air Strength volition have more than squadrons available for operations.

The proposal has been controversial, with many airpower advocates criticizing any procurement of fourth-generation aircraft equally a pace backward. However, Congress has gone forth with the plan.²³

Numerically, this is a modest shift since the Air Force proposes to buy only 12 F-15EXs in FY 2022 and 144 in full.²⁴ During the five-year menstruum, the Air Force will buy 3.five times as many F-35s. Notwithstanding, it is a major shift in acquisition strategy and opens the possibility for a larger shift in the time to come.

A-10s: The Air Force has surrendered to the will of Congress (and to existent-world operations) by re-winging the A-x fleet and extending armada life into the late-2030s rather than retiring the armada in the near term.²⁵

F-15s and F-16s: Although the Air Force plans to retire large numbers of older F-15s and F-16s, the slow rate of acquiring new aircraft requires sustaining some of these fleets for many years. F-16s still provide twoscore pct of the Air Force fighter fleet. In FY 2021, the Air Forcefulness proposes $616 one thousand thousand for F-sixteen modifications and upgrades, particularly for advanced radars. For the F-xv, it proposes to spend $349 million for a variety of upgrades, particularly for an improved radar. Spending will continue at these levels throughout the five-year period.

OA-X: This off-the-shelf light-attack aircraft (called "OA-Ten") has disappeared equally an Air Strength program. The concept was that such an shipping would be ameliorate suited for missions in low-threat environments considering information technology would be less expensive to operate, reduce wear on high-end shipping, and take more focused training. Afterward conducting several tests and experiments, the Air Strength terminated notions of an acquisition program. The posture statement says the Air Force will go along interest to help coalition partners. SOCOM will continue the program under "armed overwatch."²⁶

Next Generation Air Potency (NGAD): Coming up over the horizon is NGAD, the side by side-generation fighter/attack programme for both the Navy and Air Force. Funding in the FY 2022 budget reaches $1 billion. The plan received a lot of attention recently when the Air Forcefulness reported that a "full-scale flight demonstrator" flew. This indicated that the program might be further along than had been thought. However, the Congressional Research Service pointed out that this was non a "image," which would indicate a mature programme ready for production.²⁷

The Air Force's stated intention is to field new shipping faster, emphasizing continuous development, a shorter service life, and rapid fielding of new capabilities. If successful, this would break with half a century of practice. However, because of the secrecy surrounding the program, piddling is known. The budget justification books show research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) rising to $two.7 billion in FY 2025 merely no procurement in the 5-year program (at least in the published documents).²⁸

How this plan shakes out will profoundly affect the shape of the time to come Air Strength and, indeed, may make up one's mind whether manned shipping are a dying capability or whether they accept decades of continuing relevance.

NGAD will raise a key question: what does "legacy" hateful when talking about weapon systems? Every bit discussed in the overview affiliate of this military forces report, the armed forces services ascertain legacy as old systems in the inventory. [29] They would retire older systems and buy like but more than capable systems. Strategists, on the other hand, see legacy platforms as those that utilise one-time technologies and outdated operational concepts. They would cut manned shipping, aircraft carriers, and armored vehicles, substituting smaller unmanned and distributed systems.

Strategists will therefore likely question NGAD, arguing that developing some other expensive manned shipping is looking toward the by and not the future.

Strategists will probable question NGAD, arguing that developing another expensive manned shipping is looking toward the past and not the futurity.

Perhaps for this reason, the Navy chief of naval operations has indicated some softness in support when discussing NGAD: "Nosotros're making tough decisions on where the next dollar goes. I can't exist buying stuff but to buy it."³⁰

The Tanker Force: Still Struggling with the KC-46

The KC-46 will replace the Air Force's aging tanker forcefulness, the electric current KC-135 and KC-10 tankers having an boilerplate historic period of 58 and 35 years, respectively. The programme was thought to be low gamble since the airframe is a variant of Boeing's widely used 767.

However, the program has been troubled from the start, with first commitment not occurring until January 2019, three years belatedly, and continues to feel technical problems and product delays.³¹ Boeing, the contractor, continues to execute the stock-still toll contract that it greatly underbid and on which the company is taking big losses (over $4 billion then far).³² That underbidding strategy appears to have paid off, still, as the Air Strength has announced that it would not recompete the contract afterward the current buy merely would procure more KC-46s.

The bottom line is that the KC-46 program is still not quite gear up, and the current tanker fleet of KC-10s and KC-135s volition exist around for a lot longer.

Tactical Mobility

This big fleet consists mainly of C-130s, initially fielded in 1956 and now on the "J" model. ("Tactical mobility" also includes a few specialty aircraft, mainly small VIP passenger aircraft.) The C-130 product line is operating smoothly, and the "J" model, afterward some initial problems, has settled down. The inventory is big: near 310 C-130s for tactical mobility and some other hundred or so shipping in specialty roles.

The most recent mobility requirements study affirmed a fleet requirement of 300, about where the fleet is now.³³ The trouble is that the Air Strength is non ownership enough new shipping to maintain its large inventory. The FY 2022 budget buys merely four aircraft, and those are specialty models for special operations. The Air Force posture statement says, "we are looking closely at the right mix between modernized and legacy tactical airlift platforms."³⁴ The intention is likely to retire many of the older C-130H models and reduce the size of the armada, despite the recent requirements study.

The challenge in cut the fleet is that large numbers of these aircraft reside in the reserve components, and members of Congress are loath to lose flying squadrons in their districts.

Strategic Mobility

This fleet consists of C-17s, upgraded C-5s (which were originally built in the 1970s and 1980s), and KC-10s (also classed as refuelers because they have dual missions). No production lines are currently operating, the last C-17 having been delivered in 2013. Withal, the fleet is relatively healthy because of the large investments made in the 2000s.

The nearly recent strategic mobility report, Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Report 2018, completed in February 2019, found that the fleets were sized adequately.³⁵ A relatively immature fleet that is properly sized would seemingly signal a lot of stability.

Yet, the National Defence Strategy's focus on great power conflict raised the possibility of wartime attrition being a consideration for sizing the strategic airlift and sealift fleets, something that previous studies had not considered. Russia and Mainland china can threaten sea and air lines of advice in a style that regional threats, such equally Iran or Northward Korea, cannot. Many outside analyses had pointed to this new threat. That would bulldoze inventory requirements higher.³⁶

Congress directed that the Section of Defence force (DOD) revise the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study to consider the new strategic environment. Delivery of the expanded study has been delayed until at least spring 2021. In the concurrently, Air Force Air Mobility Control has identified survivability equally an issue and is looking at diverse aircraft cocky-protection upgrades in response to the new challenge.³⁷

Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)

For the Air Force, this revolution is over. Whereas the Navy'south efforts to integrate unmanned systems into its aviation armada are however controversial, irksome, and limited, every bit described in this projection's corresponding chapter on the Navy, the Air Force's incorporation of unmanned shipping into its force structure—after strong resistance during the 1990s and early-2000s—has become routine.³⁸

However, the Air Strength has stalled in its effort to bring more remotely piloted shipping (RPAs) into the force. The RPA proportion of the force has leveled off at 5 to 7 pct for x years, and current procurement plans bear witness no modify in the future. The FY 2022 budget procures no RPAs, and there are none in the five-twelvemonth plan. The Air Forcefulness is moving to retire the RQ-4 Global Militarist fleet in favor of the manned E-11. By contrast, the FY 2022 upkeep procures 106 manned aircraft.³⁹

The Air Forcefulness's incorporation of unmanned aircraft into its force structure . . . has become routine. However, the Air Forcefulness has stalled in its effort to bring more than RPAs into the force.

The Air Strength is experimenting with "loyal wingman" RPAs nether the umbrella of "Skyborg." The "Low-Cost Attritable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" program explores low cost, autonomous, and attritable systems, thus allowing the Air Forcefulness to operate within an antagonist'due south defensive zone. The program has produced the XQ-58A Valkyrie as a demonstrator shipping. The Air Force is emphatic that these complement, rather than replace, manned aircraft. A study past the Air Force Association's Mitchell Institute reinforced this indicate: "[drones] are complementary, force multiplying capabilities, non replacements for fifth-generation stealth shipping."^forty

These RPA initiatives might modify the inventory remainder in the future. Yet, none of these RPA programs are yet an official "program of tape."

A major issue is whether to buy RPAs for permissive or non-permissive environments.⁴¹ MQ-9 Reapers can only operate in permissive environments. That has been fine for the kinds of conflicts the United states of america has fought recently. However, in a conflict with a high-end adversary such equally Russia or Communist china, these aircraft would be vulnerable because of their slow speed, high visibility, and lack of defensive systems. The issue was illustrated dramatically in July 2022 when the Iranians shot downwardly a Navy RQ-four.

The question, and then, is twofold. First, are at that place concepts of functioning that would enable current UAVs to contribute to a high-end warfighting campaign? Second, should the Air Force develop and procure stealthy and likely largely autonomous UAVs to operate inside these challenging air defence environments? One stealthy unmanned aircraft, the RQ-170 Sentry, an Air Force/CIA collaboration, is known to exist considering one was shot down over Iran in 2011 and exhibited to the public. A possible RQ-180, an unmanned long-range reconnaissance organization, is also rumored to be flying and possibly operating.⁴²

The Curse of Brusque Range

A contempo business organisation is that the Air Force tactical aviation armada is too brusque ranged for great power conflicts. Combat ranges of electric current shipping run from about 550 to 750 miles. NGAD might accept a range of upwards to 1,000 miles, but the programme is mostly conceptual at this point.

The trouble is that demands on the fleet have inverse. During the Cold War, brusk range was not a problem because the forward fighter bases in NATO were close to the front line. Information technology was not a problem afterward the Cold War because adversaries did non have stiff antiair capabilities, and as a result, U.S. tactical aircraft could refuel equally often as they needed.

Nevertheless, in potential conflicts with Red china and Russia, operational range matters. The Pacific is vast. Although Kadena Air Force base on Okinawa is shut enough to Taiwan (400 miles), it is 1,400 miles from the S Prc Ocean, where such a disharmonize would probable take place. Anderson Air Force base of operations on Guam is 1,400 miles from the South China Ocean and 1,700 miles from Taiwan.

U.S. bases in Europe, even forward bases in Eastern Europe, are notwithstanding far from potential battlefields. RAF Lakenheath, for case, is about 1,000 miles from the Baltic states, and Spangdahlem AFB in Germany is 850 miles. Further, airbases are over again vulnerable, so U.S. aircraft may need to be based further abroad from their targets, and adversary air defenses may brand aerial tanking risky.

Every bit a outcome, many analyses recommend actions to increase standoff range and reduce vulnerability, including an emphasis on bombers because of their long range; the cutback of F-35 procurements because of their short range; the dispersion of basing; and the development of long-range strike, especially unmanned systems. For instance, in a congressionally-directed study, the Center for Strategic and Monetary Assessments (CSBA) recommended, "the Air Force should rebalance its gainsay forces in favor of long-range, penetrating bombers." CSBA too recommended developing a new, long-range fighter/set on aircraft ("penetrating counter-air") to substitute for some F-35 inventory.⁴³ Similarly, in another congressionally-directed study, the MITRE Corporation recommended: "an increment in available long-range aircraft and bases [to] strengthen the conventional deterrence posture of U.S. forces."⁴⁴

The Navy suffers from the same range limitation just has the advantage of being able to move its airfields (aircraft carriers) effectually, so this affects the Air Force more intensely.⁴⁵

Nuclear Enterprise

Afterward decades of stability and low visibility, the nuclear force is getting attention once again as the toll of modernization programs makes them more visible, and controversial.

The ICBM forcefulness has leveled off at the New START limit of 400. The nuclear bomber forcefulness (B-2s and B-52s) holds steady at 96 (total active inventory, or TAI). DOD's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in February 2018, laid out the direction of the nuclear enterprise. The NPR affirmed the need for the nuclear triad to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression and assure allies and partners.

Afterward decades of stability and low visibility, the nuclear force is getting attention once again every bit the cost of modernization programs makes them more visible, and controversial.

Further, the NPR highlighted "the increasing need for this diverseness and flexibility" as "one of the principal reasons why sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, and modernizing NC3, is necessary now."⁴⁶

However, afterwards nearly iii decades of depression public visibility and relatively low cost, the nuclear enterprise is getting more attention considering the systems acquired during the Reagan buildup of the 1980s are now reaching the cease of their service lives and must exist replaced. That brings opposition from arms-control advocates. Further, a Democratic administration will certainly revise nuclear weapons policy. Information technology will want to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the price of modernization programs. For example, the Biden campaign website endorses arms-control and "the need to reduce the role of nuclear weapons."

Table 5 shows the most controversial nuclear modernization programs.

These programs—with the B-21 bomber and the Columbia-course submarine—contribute to the nuclear modernization bow moving ridge that the DOD faces in the 2020s and 2030s and which will require the DOD to either trim programs or increase the proportion of the budget allocated to nuclear forces.⁴⁷

One piece of good news: in response to scandals several years back and several outside reviews, the Air Force (and the Navy) implemented a wide diversity of actions to improve the standards and quality of their nuclear enterprise, both personnel and operations. The absenteeism of any contempo incidents indicates success. Here, no news is practiced news.

Creation of the Infinite Force

The Infinite Strength is at present a reality equally the fifth DOD military service (the 6th U.S. military service, including the Declension Guard). Over the course of the year, the Air Forcefulness and DOD published a series of documents developing the organization and structure of the Space Force. About six,000 personnel have been transferred to this new service, all from the Air Force. A after chapter on the Infinite Forcefulness volition describe these actions in more than item.

So far, the split has been amicable. The Air Force has supported the establishment of the new service and facilitated its stand up up. There has been none of the acrimony that is seen in most divorces. Nonetheless, major elements of the division of personnel, facilities, and organizations are still unresolved. Specially sensitive will be the requirement that the creation of the Infinite Force entail no increase in the number of DOD personnel; every Space Force billet created will come out of the Air Forcefulness total.

Munitions as an Chemical element of Strategy: Volume for a Long War

All the services are buying more than munitions considering many analyses bear witness that U.S. forces would expend large amounts of munitions in a great power conflict. Thus, the Air Force upkeep procures a lot of munitions. This year the Air Forcefulness'southward strategy seems to accept changed, maintaining product of long-range and air-to-air munitions but cut air-to-footing munitions. This likely reflects the winding down of the air war in the Heart Due east and a judgment that great power conflict, especially in the Western Pacific, would be less nigh ground operations and more about air and maritime operations.

Procurement of munitions may not concord up if budgets decline. The downside of munitions conquering is that they are sterile; once procured, they go on the shelf to be used in instance of conflict. If no disharmonize requires their use, then the services must pay to dispose of the munitions at the end of their useful life. Because munitions are not visible, they may not contribute significantly to deterrence. For this reason, many U.S. allies and partners do non have big munitions stocks despite the wartime requirement.

By dissimilarity, aircraft, ships, and vehicles get used every day; their visibility creates a perception of U.S. adequacy in potential adversaries and thus adds to deterrence. As a consequence, there is always pressure to buy platforms rather than munitions.

Mark Cancian (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the International Security Program at the Heart for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

This study is produced by the Heart for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, revenue enhancement-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Appropriately, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should exist understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Source: https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy-2021-air-force